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Abstract
This thesis examines the process by which cultural value predispositions influence perceptions of risks
and benefits of energy policies, specifically focusing on High Voltage Power Line (HVPL) installations and
Hydraulic Fracturing (fracking). For HVPL installations I examine the role of (dis)trust in three groups
associated with the HVPL debate – the government, environmental groups, and the energy industry – in
determining risk and benefit perceptions of HVPL installation. Findings indicate that cultural value
predispositions guide policy elites’ perceptions of trustworthiness. Further, this trust, in turn, guides
perceptions of risks and benefits of HVPL installations, partially mediating the effects of cultural value
predispositions on risk and benefit perceptions. For fracking, I introduce the concept of knowledge hubris
and examine the cultural value-based origins of knowledge hubris and the resulting role knowledge hubris
plays in predicting risk and benefit perceptions associated with fracking. Further, I compare the role of
knowledge hubris in risk and benefit assessments between a sample of the general public and local
policy elites. Results indicate that the origins of knowledge hubris are similar between local policy elites
and the general public. However, the influence of this knowledge hubris on risk and benefit perceptions of
fracking is different between the two groups.
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Introduction
The influence of cultural value predispositions on risk and benefit perceptions has been often researched
in a plethora of domains, generally focusing on direct relationships between the two constructs. The
causal process by which cultural values influence risk and benefit perceptions, however, has been
relatively unexplored. Thus, the two papers in the current thesis focus on examining the causal
mechanisms by which cultural value predispositions influence risk and benefit perceptions. Utilizing the
context of proposed High Voltage Power Line installations in the state of Arkansas, the first paper
examines how the cultural value predispositions of local policy elites shape perceptions of trustworthiness
toward three groups associated with the debate – the government, environmental groups, and the energy
industry – and how this (dis)trust influences risk and benefit perceptions associated with HVPL
installations. Generally, I argue that an individual’s cultural values lead to trusting information from
sources that are perceived as congruent with their values, and distrusting information from sources
whose values are perceived as incongruent, and it is this resulting (dis)trust that shapes risk and benefit
perceptions.
The second paper focuses on risks and benefits associated with hydraulic fracturing, utilizing a
sample of local policy elites and the general public from the states of Arkansas and Oregon. I introduce
the concept of knowledge hubris – the degree to which perceived and actual knowledge are congruent –
and examine its cultural values-based origins and the resulting risk and benefit perceptions associated
with fracking. For this, I argue that knowledge hubris stems from identity protection desires which are
oriented around an individual’s cultural value predispositions. In addition to examining the mediating role
knowledge hubris plays in the relationship between cultural values and risk and benefit perceptions
associated with fracking, this paper examines the similarities and differences between local policy elites
and the general public in terms of both the origins of knowledge hubris and its effects on risk and benefit
perceptions associated with fracking.
Together, these two papers shed light on two of the mechanisms by which cultural value
predispositions might shape perceptions of risks and benefits. Further, these papers focus on an often
neglected group of individuals who are central to the policy-making process – local policy elites.
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The Origin and Role of Trust in Local Policy Elites’ Perceptions on High Voltage Power Line
Installations in the State of Arkansas
By: Clayton Creed Tumlison, Rachael Moyer, Geoboo Song

ABSTRACT: The debate over installation of high voltage power lines (HVPLs) has been intense,
particularly in Northwest Arkansas. Detractors claim that the installation will negatively affect both the
natural environment and the local economy, which contains a large tourism component. By contrast,
those in favor of installing HVPLs claim that the installation is necessary in order to reliably support the
increasing demand for electric power. Using original data collected from a recent statewide Internet
survey of 420 local policy elites in Arkansas, this paper focuses on two key aspects. First, we examine
how local policy elites’ perceptions of risks versus benefits of HVPL installation in their communities are
influenced by their levels of trust toward information provided by various sources (e.g., energy industry,
environmental groups, and government). Second, we utilize Cultural Theory (CT) to explain how the
cultural worldviews of policy elites – specifically, egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism –
shape these levels of trust and HVPL benefit-risk perceptions, while controlling for other factors claimed
by previous literature, including levels of knowledge on energy related issues and demographic
characteristics. In general, our analysis indicates that policy elites’ value-oriented formation of HVPL
benefit-risk perceptions is partially due to the influence cultural values have on trust in information
sources. We conclude this paper by discussing broader implications for the origin and role of trust in
policy elites’ decisions throughout the policymaking process.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The benefit-risk perceptions of policy elites may have a direct bearing on individual level policy decisions
and broader policymaking practices in society (1,2). An examination of factors that may influence the
formation of such perceptions can provide valuable insight into understanding particular policy choices
supported – or opposed – by various policy actors, or further afield, into proposing new approaches to
policymaking, especially in an adversarial policy subsystem (3,4). This study examines the origin and the
1

role of local policy elites’ trust in different information sources vis-à-vis their benefit-risk assessments of
proposed High Voltage Power Line (HVPL) installations in the state of Arkansas.
The delivery of electricity in the United States depends upon a complex network of transmission
2

lines and is regulated by various governmental agencies. The installation of additional transmission lines
increases the capacity of electric transmission and creates flexibility in the case of transmission line
interruptions by allowing electricity to be rerouted, thereby reducing the risk of cascading failures and the
3

resulting negative economic impact (5) . Socio-political controversies related to the installations of these
lines often result in delays to needed upgrades and have the potential to threaten the economy at the
local, state, and national level due to the interconnectedness of the nation’s power grid.
As such, a recent controversial policy debate in Arkansas over an application to begin HVPL
4

installation resulted in postponements of the planned installation and in the proposal of legislation aimed
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This research uses the conceptual definition of “local policy elites” referred to as “policy actors who hold
various political resources to be utilized to exert potential influence in various phases of policy process,
including agenda setting, policy analysis, policy formulation, policy implementation, and policy feedback,
at the local level, as suggested by Moyer and Song (1). Policy elites of this sort may include city mayors,
city council members, city clerks, city government officials, and chamber of commerce members.
2
The national energy grid is overseen by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the
U.S. Department of Energy and coordinated by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC).
3
Interruptions in electricity have economic implications. Severe weather poses the largest threat to
reliable power (5). Economic loss due to school and businesses closings, the discontinuation of
necessary services and even loss of life due to severe weather amount to between $18 and $33 billion
every year, while more significant weather events like Hurricane Sandy (2012) are estimated to cost
closer to $52 billion (5). Because climate change is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of
weather-related events in the near future, the security and reliability of the United States Energy Grid is a
national priority (5). Additionally, the majority of the nation’s transmission lines are more than 25 years
old, resulting in the dissipation of energy, which constrains the nation’s electric supply during periods of
demand (6).
4
An application with the Arkansas Public Service Commission was filed for a Certificate of Environmental
Compatibility and Public Need in 2013 (7). The Southwest Power Pool is the NERC’s regional entity for
the southwest United States and operates over 48,000 miles of transmission lines to serve more than 15
million people in a nearly 400,000 square mile area (8). In 2008, SPP mandated the installation of a 48
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at restricting the placement of future lines in the state. This offered an opportunity to investigate the riskbenefit perceptions surrounding the issue – as a critical aspect of policy decisions – particularly among
those local policy elites in the affected regions. The installation of HVPLs is perceived as threatening to
some who claim that the lines will degrade the natural environment, compromise human health, tarnish
the natural beauty of the area and negatively impact the tourism-based local economy (9). Others see the
installation as the inevitable result of a growing area population that will provide efficient, reliable
electricity and strengthen the national energy grid (8).
In an effort to understand such contrasting attitudes toward HVPL installations, this paper focuses
on two key aspects. First, we examine local policy elites’ levels of trust toward information provided by
various sources and how this influences their policy reasoning with regard to their perceptions of the
benefits versus risks of the installation of HVPLs in their communities. Second, we further investigate the
origin of policy elites’ aforementioned trust (or lack thereof). For this latter inquiry in particular, we utilize
Cultural Theory (CT) (10) to explain how such trust is rooted in policy elites’ cultural worldviews –
specifically, hierarchism, fatalism, egalitarianism, and individualism – while considering the effects of
other factors claimed by previous literature, including domain specific knowledge and demographic
characteristics. Broader implications for the origin and role of trust in policy elites’ decisions throughout
the policymaking process will also be discussed.

2. RISKS AND BENEFITS OF HIGH VOLTAGE POWER LINE INSTALLATIONS
When probing risks and benefits associated with HVPL installations, we can consider them from both a
societal and an individual perspective, which is well highlighted in the related policy debate in the state of
Arkansas. From a societal perspective, an updated national energy grid is important to both national
security and the national economy. Smaller regional energy grid networks are responsible for providing
energy to the businesses and residents of several states, affecting millions of people. However, national
mile 345 kV transmission line for northwest Arkansas, part of an $8.1 billion planned upgrade to the grid
for the 2000-2011 planning cycle (8).
5
Controversies concerning the installation of HVPLs are prevalent throughout the United States. Some of
the most publicized include the Susquehanna-Roseland project in New Jersey, Dominion Power-James
River project in Virginia, Rock Island Clean Line project in Iowa, Luzerne–Wayne project in Pennsylvania,
Palo Verde-Devers project in Arizona and California, Lassen County-Santa Clara project in California,
Northern Pass project in New Hampshire and Canada, and the Fredericksburg-Lampasas project in
Texas.
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parks and regional and local industries – particularly those that are tourism-based – may be threatened
due to large-scale environmental changes necessary to accommodate new and upgraded power lines (9).
Furthermore, the risks derived from pesticide use to clear vegetation surrounding power lines creates
large-scale health risks, as this chemical usage may contaminate sources of groundwater and drinking
water (9). From an individual perspective, a reliable energy supply is necessary to provide expected
convenience and to support existing lifestyles and economic benefits. However, the resulting
infrastructure can lower the property value of individuals, especially for those whose residences are
adjacent to it (11,12). In addition, individuals in close proximity to HVPLs may feel that they are at risk for
exposure to electromagnetic fields (EMFs) generated by HVPLs, though there have been no robust
scientific grounds for such concerns (11).
The recent policy debate on the proposed HVPL installation in Arkansas reflects the various
aspects of such benefits and risks. For instance, in 2013, the Southwest Power Pool claimed that benefits
of HVPL installation in the Ozark Mountain area included a stable and reliable energy supply which would
reduce costs associated with power loss caused by supply interruption as well as lowering costs through
increased efficiency in transmission (13). They further argued that HVPL installation would provide new
economic opportunities, create jobs, and connect future renewable energy sources to the national grid, as
well as use land efficiently. However, there were publically expressed concerns associated with the
proposed HVPL installation, including “impacts to wildlife, possible groundwater pollution if herbicides are
used to keep power lines clear, visual pollution and decreased property values” as well as the
degradation of the scenic beauty which supports the tourism-based economy of Northwest Arkansas and
potential health risks associated with EMF exposure (9).

3. THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES
The risk perception literature provides a theoretical framework for explaining the variation in individuals’
perceived benefits and risks associated with HVPLs, which is directly applicable in the understanding of
related perceptual differences among local policy elites in the state of Arkansas – a primary concern of
this research. The literature has identified a multitude of factors that affect the perceptions of benefits and
risks across many different domains, including psychometric characteristics of risk (14), demographic
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characteristics (15), knowledge level on a risk or its source (16), trust toward relevant information sources
of a risk (17), and individual values, specifically cultural predispositions (18). Following is a brief
discussion on those theoretical approaches relevant to understanding the HVPL benefit-risk perceptions
of local policy elites in Arkansas. We then provide theoretical postulations regarding the relationship
between intrinsic value predispositions, trust in sources of information, and benefit-risk perceptions of
HVPLs.

3.1. Demographics and Knowledge
Previous research has demonstrated that individuals’ demographic characteristics, particularly gender
and race, can influence their risk perceptions. Some studies have identified what is commonly referred to
as the “white male effect” (19). These studies report that males perceive consistently lower levels of risk
associated with environmental health threats than females (15), and white individuals tend to indicate
lower levels of risk than non-white individuals across a variety of risk domains (19). Interestingly, this
gender difference in risk perceptions is not restricted to judgment among the general public. Scientists,
who are generally assumed to hold a relatively sophisticated level of scientific knowledge and expertise,
have been found to exhibit similar perceptual patterns. For example, male scientists’ perceived nuclear
risk has been found to be substantially lower than that of female scientists (20). Kahan, Jenkins-Smith
and Braman (21) argue that these findings stem from a unique value identity that is rooted on
individualism and hierarchism shared among “white males” in the context of the United States, which
translates into risk-taking attitudes in the assessment of potential benefits and risks of science and
technology utilization, such that the evaluation reinforces their views on a resilient ecological system and
the promotion of market-oriented entrepreneurship (21). Similarly, one would expect to find discernible
variations based on demographic characteristics in local policy elites’ personal assessments of benefits
and risks relating to the installation of HVPLs in the state of Arkansas.
An individual’s knowledge level regarding subtleties of the sources of risk and danger has also
been offered as an explanation as to why people perceive benefits and risks differently (22). This
“knowledge theory of risk perception” suggests that those who are more knowledgeable regarding
potential hazards are able to make more objective and accurate evaluations as compared to those who
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are less knowledgeable. This “knowledge thesis” has mainly been examined in terms of differences of risk
perceptions between experts and the general population, with experts being assumed to be more
knowledgeable. Empirically, results have been mixed. Some studies have found significant differences in
risk assessments between the two groups across risk domains, including chemicals (23), biotechnology
(24) and nanotechnology (25). However, other studies claim that, due to methodological validity issues in
previous studies, there is little evidence to support the argument that the risk judgment of experts is
different than that of lay people (26). While there is debate regarding the knowledge hypothesis, there is
enough evidence to consider an individual’s level of knowledge on state energy issues a potential
contributing factor in variations in benefit-risk assessment of HVPL installations among Arkansas local
policy elites.

3.2. Value Predispositions and Grid-Group Cultural Theory
Grid-group cultural theory (CT) of risk perception stems from research examining how socio-political
conflict and policy debate reflect various cultural outlooks within society(27). Early work by Douglas and
Wildavsky (18) suggests that perceptions of risk are developed in such a way as to sustain an individual’s
preferred “way of life” or “cultural worldview”. Conceptions of risks are, therefore, claimed to apply to
domains and issues that would violate these dispositional preferences, resulting in debates regarding
risks not necessarily confined to the technical aspects, but extended to the sociopolitical, which are
oftentimes related to the more intrinsic question of how a society should be structured and function
(18,28). Wildavsky & Dake (22), for instance, found CT a superior theory in predicting individual level risk
perceptions across several risk domains, particularly as compared to other theoretical lenses, such as
those based on differences in knowledge, personality, economic, and political views, providing early
support for the theoretical claim that perspectives of risk are socially constructed.
Variations in individuals’ perceptions of risk in various contexts have been examined utilizing this
theoretical lens of social construction of risks (2–4,29–31). According to CT, “social relations” are the
means through which “cultural biases” are shared. These biases, and the social relations stemming from
them, reflect general attitudes and worldviews that are shared across socially constructed systems (32).
Further, these biases help determine individual behavior, including the attention that is paid to certain
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types of risk as well as risk taking preferences in different contexts (32). A typology of four primary cultural
worldviews (i.e., egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism) is derived based on two
dimensions of social relations – “grid,” which is based on the extent to which individuals follow an “explicit
set of institutionalized classifications” and “group,” which represents the extent to which individuals view
themselves as bound to their social group (32).
CT suggests that each worldview is “contradistinct” to the others, and that they function together
as a system, which allows an individual who holds a given worldview to rely on the distinctions from other
worldviews to reinforce their own cultural biases (32). These unique worldviews create distinct risk
perceptions in individuals based on perceived threats to their way of life. Long term stability is maintained
by the critical system formed by this “dynamic imbalance” (18), as a system “in which ways of life are
nicely balanced is less prone to being surprised and will have a wider repertoire to draw from in
responding to novel situations” (32).
Egalitarians (low grid-high group) lack differentiation in their roles within the group, while being
strongly bound to their social group. Equitable distribution and fairness are deemed highly valuable.
Egalitarians tend to distrust authority, which reinforces group cohesion, and perceive high levels of risk,
particularly in the realms of technological development and economic growth (32). Individualists (log gridlow group) are not bound by rules or social groups and generally prefer a libertarian society, seeing risk
as opportunity (32). Individualists dislike external control, and thus tend to believe that society functions
best when everyone, including the disadvantaged, compete, succeed, and fail as individuals. Hierarchs
(high grid-high group) value both institutional and social rules, which maintain valued social order. High
levels of risk are often considered acceptable, with reliance on setting the right course for society being
placed on experts. Success, from a hierarch’s perspective, is attainable by obeying authority, and those
who break rules should suffer severe and fast punishment. Fatalists (high grid-low group) are bound by
social constructs but excluded from social groups. Fatalists view themselves as at the mercy of fate, and
thus are skeptical of their own ability to seize control of situations they encounter.
The interrelationships between these different cultural worldviews form a “behind-the-scenes”
economic system wherein hierarchs and individualists are focused on wealth creation, while egalitarians
value equality in economic distribution (32). CT further suggests distinct ideas regarding nature held by
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each worldview, with egalitarians viewing nature as fragile and easily damaged. Thus, nature must be
managed carefully to avoid complete collapse, with experimentation being forbidden (32–34).
Alternatively, individualists believe the need for management of nature is minimal, as nature maintains
equilibrium itself. This, in turn, allows for trial and error in regards to the environment, in pursuit of the
“best possible” outcomes (32–34). Hierarchs hold somewhat similar views regarding nature, viewing it as
robust and tolerant. However, as opposed to individualists, hierarchs believe that the potential for
occasional events that can upset nature’s equilibrium necessitates strict regulations aimed at preventing
these potential calamities. This stems from the hierarch’s desire for a certain and predictable future based
on expert evaluation (32–34). True to form, fatalists view nature as simply a function of chance.

3.3 Trust
Trust is an often-utilized concept in explaining perceptions of risk (and, similarly, “acceptance”). However,
trust – both how it is derived and how it affects other factors – has been conceptualized in many different
ways in risk perception literature. Luhmann (35) takes a very cognitive approach, describing trust as the
outcome of an active choice on the part of the trusting party derived from the weighing of benefits and
risks in allowing the trustee to act on the trusting party’s behalf, with no control over the trustee’s actions.
Frewer and Salter (36) suggest that trust should be categorized utilizing a three-tier system. The first tier
is individualized trust, in which a party simply trusts another person or product. The second tier is systemoriented and directed toward institutions. Lastly, the third-tier is relational. In this last tier, trust is the result
of personal experience and interactions between the individual and another person or group. It can be
argued that both the first and third tiers are derived by some level of dyadic interactions, the third tier
exclusively so. The second tier can be causally ambiguous in addition to being derived from some level of
dyadic interactions. Another conceptualization of trust, similar to that of the second tier proposed by
Frewer & Salter (36), is that of social trust, which is “the willingness to rely on those who have the
responsibility for making decisions and taking actions related to the management of technology, the
environment, medicine, or other realms of public health and safety” (17). Siegrist et al. (17) suggest that
social trust is derived through salient value similarity. Salient values “consist of the individual’s sense of
what the important goals (ends) and/or processes (means) are that should be followed in a particular
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situation” (17). As such, the concept of salient values is contextually based, meaning that values in one
situation may not be congruent in a different situation or context, thus making the origin of trust fluid and
context specific.
In terms of the origins of trust in a given source of information among local policy elites, we take
an approach similar to that of Siegrist et al. (17). However, we apply a Cultural Theory perspective;
whereas in Siegrist et al.’s conceptualization, the origin of trust relies on the fluidity of salient values in
determining trust, explicitly counter to Cultural Theory (17). Instead, we view an individual’s cultural value
predispositions as providing a framework for one’s trust in an information source. More specifically, we
argue that the cultural value predispositions individuals possess contribute to their motivated reasoning,
and thus their willingness to trust a deliberately chosen source of information. One of the key components
of motivated reasoning – “the systematic biasing of judgments in favor of one’s immediately accessible
beliefs and feelings” (37)– is the idea of selective exposure, which posits that individuals choose
information sources that are congruent with their currently held beliefs (30,38,39). Two other components
of motivated reasoning are likely to come into play in the willingness to trust a given information source –
confirmation bias and disconfirmation bias. Confirmation bias suggests that individuals tend to give
greater credit to evidence that is congruent with their previous beliefs while disconfirmation bias does the
inverse, in that individuals counter-argue evidence that is incongruent with prior views and beliefs (39).
We thus expect that, through motivated reasoning processes, trust in an information source will arise not
from the accuracy or quality of the information, but, at least in part, from the perceived congruence
between the origin of the information and an individual’s deeply held cultural value predispositions.
Trust has also been examined in terms of its influence on perceptions of risks and benefits. Trust
in authorities has consistently been found to exert an influence on risk perceptions across various risk
domains (40–44). Further, trust has been demonstrated to influence acceptance via its effect on
perceptions of risk and benefits (45,46) and is suggested to be utilized to decrease the cognitive load of
an individual by allowing them to make “rational” decisions by relying on information provided by those
whose opinion they deem accurate (16,47), in turn shaping perceptions of risks and benefits. Importantly,
trust contains an affective component, including concerns of honesty and integrity, which can lead to
greater perceptions of risk when trust is lacking (47,48). Cultural values, for example, are likely to
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influence trust. In an effort to validate their worldview, individuals will categorize those who share their
views as being honest and high in integrity (and conversely perceive those who do not share their
worldviews to be relatively dishonest and low in integrity), reinforcing their own cultural biases (32).
While there is often an implicit assumption of the role of trust in studies utilizing cultural theory to
explain risk perceptions, there is a relative dearth of studies systematically and empirically investigating
these relationships. Some studies have recently begun to explicitly examine the general proposition
regarding trust – particularly as related to risk perceptions and policy attitudes – being derived from value
congruence between the receiver and provider of related information. In explicating perceptions of
scientific consensus on the topics of climate change, nuclear waste disposal, and handgun regulation, for
instance, Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman (49) conducted an experiment in which they provided
subjects with information regarding an “expert’s” cultural values and found that subjects rated experts as
more knowledgeable and trustworthy when the expert’s view on the risk related issues was more
congruent with their own cultural value predispositions. Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, Cohen, & Kysar
(50) also found that polarization of views of risks related to nanotechnology were at least partially
accounted for by the congruence of the individual’s cultural worldviews and those of the “experts”
advocating for – or against – further nanotechnology research. Value congruence, in this particular
research, was considered a proxy for credibility, which is dependent on trust (50). Similar results were
also reported in an experimental study regarding risks associated with the human papillomavirus (HPV)
vaccine (51).
While informative, previous studies on the role of trust in benefit-risk perceptions lack definitive
connection between implicit theoretical premises and more direct empirical tests pertaining to the
question of the origin of trust. In this study, we, therefore, attempt to place more emphasis on situating the
role of trust in comprehending the influence of more intrinsic dispositional values on benefit-risk
perceptions while systematically examining triadic relationships between cultural values, trust, and HVPL
benefit-risk perceptions using original data collected from a recent statewide survey distributed to
Arkansas local policy elites. In doing so, we seek to address some of the criticisms of the CT-based
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approach , specifically, its low proportion of variance explained – in comparison with other factors claimed
by competing theoretical approaches (e.g., affective feelings) – reported in previous empirical risk
perception research (44,57) by considering the process by which cultural values might more distally exert
an influence on risk and benefit perceptions through mediating factors, such as trust.

3.4 Hypotheses
The focus of this study is the examination of the origin of trust in information sources and the resulting
role that trust plays in benefit-risk perceptions. As discussed, the issue of HVPL installation involves very
strong proposed benefits and risks in both economic and environmental domains. As such, we expect
that local policy elites with distinctive cultural orientations would exhibit substantively different perceptions
of benefits and risks associated with HVPL installation.
Egalitarians perceive high levels of risk, particularly in the realms of technological development
and economic growth (32) and view nature as fragile and easily damaged. Thus, we expect egalitarians
to perceive greater HVPL risks (as compared to benefits). Individualists and hierarchs are both accepting
of risks (32) and view nature as relatively robust. Accordingly, we anticipate that these two cultural types
would perceive greater HVPL benefits (as compared to risks). Finally, fatalists view fate as chance, thus
we expect them to exhibit no particular relationship with HVPL benefit-risk perceptions.
In examining trust in information sources, we explore trust in three different sources of
information: the energy industry, environmental conservation groups, and government agencies. We
hypothesize that strong egalitarians would (a) distrust the energy industry – viewing them as dangerous
to the environment and representing a lack of fairness and equality in policy-making, and (b) trust
environmental conservation groups – due to their shared view of nature and ecosystem as vulnerable.

7

Quite contrastingly, we hypothesize that strong individualists would (a) trust the energy industry – due to
its representation of market-based competition and entrepreneurship, and (b) distrust environmental

6

For a more in-depth discussion on the critiques of CT, see Boholm (52), Marris, Langford, & O’Riordan
(53), Renn & Rohrmann (54), Rippl (55), and Sjoeberg (56).
7
We did not include a working hypothesis regarding strong egalitarians and trust in the government, as it
can be argued that for strong egalitarians, government plays an ambiguous role in relation to equality in
the policy-making process; a negative role in that policy decisions are made by just a few within the
government, and a positive role in that government provides access to individuals to voice concerns
and/or opinions.
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conservation groups and government agencies – due to the perception that each of these impinge on
individual liberties. For strong hierarchs, we expect (a) trust in the energy industry and government
agencies – as they both represent experts and authority in a given field, and (b) distrust in environmental
groups – as they represent deviance from institutionalized authority (in the HVPL installation context in
particular). Finally, for strong fatalists, we expect no significant relationships regarding trust toward
information sources – as, according to CT, they tend to be apathetic to, and detached from, any
meaningful policy deliberation.
In considering the role of trust in information sources in benefit-risk perceptions, we expect
several key relationships based upon our previous discussion of the debate regarding HVPL installation
and its proposed benefits and consequences. We expect (a) trust in the energy industry to increase
perceived levels of benefits (as compared to risks), (b) trust in environmental conservation groups to
increase levels of perceived risks (as compared to benefits), and (c) trust in government agencies to
increase perceived levels of benefits (as compared to risks).
In short, the analysis of our primary interest in this study is the examination of the mediating role
of trust in information sources between cultural predispositions and HVPL benefit-risk perceptions among
Arkansas local policy elites. In response, we postulate that, generally, the relationships between policy
elites’ cultural values and their HVPL benefit-risk perceptions would be mediated through trust in
information sources. Furthermore, we anticipate that each of four cultural orientations (i.e., egalitarianism,
individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism) would hold different mediational patterns. In other words, the
four “theoretical” cultural types are expected to have differing HVPL benefit/risk perceptions, partially
because their levels of (dis)trust in various information sources (i.e., the energy industry, environmental
groups, and government) would be dissimilar, as specified in the previous discussion.

4. DATA, VARIABLES, AND MEASURES
4.1 Survey Data
Between March and August of 2014, a confidential Internet survey was distributed to a sample of 2,471
Arkansas local policy elites using their publicly available email addresses. These potential survey
participants included city mayors, city council members, city clerks, city government officials, and
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chamber of commerce members in over 51 cities in the state of Arkansas. In order to construct this elite
9

survey sample , we navigated through each of Arkansas’ 51 municipal government websites and carefully
evaluated which city officials’ positions closely match the conceptual definition of local policy elites we
provided in Footnote 1 in the introduction section of this paper. We then selected those policy elites who
were likely to be concerned about HVPL issues and whose email addresses were available to the public.
Among 2,471 policy elites who received our survey invitation email that contained a brief explanation of
10

the survey and an embedded survey link, 420 took the survey . This voluntary survey consisted of 36
substantive questions focusing on Arkansas energy policy issues regarding HVPL installations and city
level sustainable energy measures. Additionally, included were questions regarding cultural worldviews,
affective feelings, knowledge regarding Arkansas energy issues, trust of information sources, and
demographic characteristics. The University Institutional Review Board approved this survey study,
including data collection protocol.

4.2 Dependent Variable and Measures
The perceived benefits and risks that Arkansas policy elites hold regarding the installation of HVPLs is the
primary dependent variable of interest in this analysis. This was operationalized utilizing specific aspects
of HVPL benefits and risks which have been observed in various debates over HVPL installation (11,12)
and were expressed during public comments made to the Arkansas Public Service Commission in
Northwest Arkansas in 2013. As presented in Table I, a total of eleven survey items were used to
measure HVPL benefit and risk perceptions. A composite HVPL benefit-risk index was developed utilizing
six benefit measures (reverse-coded) and five risk measures which were averaged together to provide a
single benefit-risk score. The six benefit items addressed economic, health-related, and environmental
benefit dimensions, including energy supply stability and reliability, efficient energy transmission and land
8

Among these Arkansas cities are Little Rock, Fort Smith, Fayetteville, Springdale, Jonesboro, North
Little Rock, Conway, Rodgers, Pine Bluffs, Bentonville, Hot Springs, Benton, Texarkana, Sherwood,
Jacksonville, Russellville, Bella Vista, Cabot, Van Buren, Maumelle, Siloam Springs, Harrison, Magnolia,
Arkadelphia, Batesville, Hope, Greenwood, Osceola, Lowell, Beebe, Morrilton, De Queen, Farmington,
Alma, Berryville, Walnut Ridge, Pea Ridge, Dardanelle, Ashdown, Dumas, Cherokee village, Gentry,
Tontitown, Huntsville, West Fork, Mayflower, Carlisle, Centerton, Greenland, Elkins, and Eureka Springs.
9
For demographic characteristics of this local policy elite sample in comparison with that of the general
public in Arkansas and in the United States, see Appendix I.
10
It is noteworthy that some local policy elites may have received a personal invitation from a recognized
community leader asking for their survey participation.
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use, job creation, provision for renewable energy, and maintenance of necessary services during postdisaster or high energy demand periods. Similarly, the five risk items address economic, health-related,
and environmental risk dimensions, including decreasing property values and threats to local industries
(e.g., tourism), environmental degradation from clear cutting trees or pesticide and herbicide use, and
negative health impacts due to electromagnetic field emission. All items were measured on an elevenpoint scale assessing perceived level of benefit (risk), with the final benefit-risk index representing
aggregate perceptions of benefits and risks where higher scores indicate greater risks and lesser
benefits. These items were highly reliable, with a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.92.
(Table I about here)
4.3 Independent Variables and Mediators
The primary independent variables are individuals’ cultural predispositions (i.e., egalitarianism,
individualism, hierarchism, and fatalism). As presented in Table II, we utilized a previously validated scale
consisting of three survey items to measure each of four value orientations for a total of twelve items
(3,4,30,58,59). Survey respondents were provided twelve statements designed to measure their cultural
orientations and rated their level of agreement with each statement on a seven-point scale ranging from 1
(=Strongly disagree) to 7 (=Strongly agree). Using data derived from the survey results of these twelve
cultural theory items, we then conducted factor analysis and optimized the four factor solution, in which
each set of three CT items was loaded onto one of four latent dimensions. These extracted dimensions
conceptually matched each of the four cultural orientations suggested by CT. Based on the factor
structure matrix derived from this factor analysis, factor scores for each of the four latent dimensions were
calculated and used as an index for measuring each respondent’s cultural orientations. Chronbach’s
alpha scores for each set of three CT items range from 0.67 to 0.78, indicating an acceptable range of
measurement reliability within the survey items for each of the four cultural value dimensions.
(Table II about here)
In order to measure our mediation variables, Arkansas local policy elites’ levels of trust toward
various information sources (e.g., the energy industry, environmental groups, and government), we asked
our survey respondents about their levels of perceived trustworthiness of each information source as it
pertains to energy issues, including high voltage power lines, on an eleven-point scale ranging from 0
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(=Not at all trustworthy) to 10 (=Completely trustworthy). Higher scores on this scale represent higher
degrees of perceived trustworthiness of a particular information source, as displayed in Table III.
(Table III about here)
4.4 Control Variables and Measures
As shown in Table IV, other variables, which have been claimed by previous studies to exert influence on
benefit-risk perceptions, were utilized as control variables. These include an individual’s level of
knowledge on energy issues and his or her demographic characteristics such as race, gender, age,
education, and income. To measure respondents’ knowledge levels, we asked a series of eight true/false
questions relating to various energy issues in the state of Arkansas. A respondent’s knowledge score was
the sum of correct answers to these eight questions, with higher scores representing higher knowledge
levels. For demographic characteristics we included race (coded 1 for Non-Hispanic Whites and 0 for all
others), gender (coded 1 for Male and 0 for all others), age (age in years), education (a seven-point scale
with higher ratings representing higher education levels), and income (a four-point rising scale).
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(Table IV about here)
5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In order to verify our hypotheses pertaining to the triadic relationships between cultural orientations, trust
in information sources, and HVPL benefit-risk perceptions among Arkansas local policy elites, we utilized
mediation analysis outlined by Preacher and Hayes (60,61).

11

12

Using the SPSS macro MEDIATE (60, 61),

Descriptive statistics and frequency distributions of the aforementioned variables are presented in
Appendix II and Appendix III.
12
Similar results were obtained when we utilized the mediation analysis methods suggested by Baron and
Kenny,(62), which involved the following analytical steps. First, based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
estimation, we regressed HVPL benefit-risk perceptions on four CT measures while controlling for
knowledge level and standard demographics to establish the suggested relationship between the primary
independent variable (i.e., cultural orientations) and the dependent variable (i.e., HVPL benefit-risk
perception). Second, holding the right side of the equation exactly the same with the regression model
estimated in the first step, we ran regression while placing the trust variable in the left side of the
regression equation to check if the primary independent variables (i.e., cultural orientations) are
associated with the mediator variable (i.e., trust). Third, in order to precisely estimate the relationship
between the mediator variable (i.e., trust) and the dependent variable (i.e., HVPL benefit-risk
perceptions), we ran the regression while adding the trust variable to the right side of the regression
equation used for the first step of the analysis. Finally, we follow Baron & Kenny’s (62) recommendation
of utilizing the Sobel test (63) for inference, which calculates a z-statistic for the estimated mediation
effect in order to test a statistical hypothesis pertaining to whether there is a statistical significance in such
mediation effect based upon a Gaussian distributional assumption. These analytical steps were iterated
for each of the three mediating variables (i.e., trust in energy industry, trust in environmental groups, and
trust in government). All variables used for these analytical steps were standardized for ease of
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we estimated the effects of the four CT variables on HVPL benefit–risk perceptions through three trustrelated variables while controlling for policy elites’ knowledge level and standard demographics. Based on
OLS regression, MEDIATE accommodates multiple mediator variables assuming that each variable
operates in parallel and there are no interaction effects between the independent variables and the
mediating variables in the model (64). All measures used for this analysis were standardized for ease of
interpretability of final results. Table V reports the analytical results in detail, while Figure 1 more
13

succinctly visualizes those results .
(Table V and Figure 1 about here)
5.1 Egalitarianism, Trust and HVPL Benefit-Risk Perceptions
For the relationship between egalitarianism and HVPL benefit-risk perceptions, we found that our
measure of egalitarianism is positively related with our benefit-risk index (β = +0.106, p<0.05),
demonstrating that as egalitarianism scores increase, perceptions of risk in the installation of HVPLs
increase as well, as presented in Figure 1. Furthermore, we found that egalitarianism is negatively related
to trust in the energy industry (β = -0.223, p<0.05), while trust in the energy industry is inversely
associated with the benefit-risk index (β = -0.279, p<0.05). From this, we can infer that egalitarianism
holds positive indirect effect on perceived risk associated with HVPL installations through trust in energy
industry (β = +0.062, p<0.05), as presented in Table V.
Conversely to trust in the energy industry, egalitarianism is positively related to trust in
environmental groups (β = +0.326, p<0.05), while trust in environmental groups is positively related to the
benefit-risk index (β = +0.348, p<0.05). Accordingly, we can conclude that trust in information from
environmental groups statistically significantly mediates the effect of egalitarianism on HVPL benefit-risk
perceptions, while results in positive indirect effect of egalitarianism on benefit-risk perceptions (β =
+0.114, p<0.05), as presented in Table V.

interpretability of final results, and analytic results can be seen in tables and figures appearing in
Appendix IV.
13
One anonymous reviewer suggested that it is possible that our modeling assumptions may be incorrect
– specifically, that trust may be temporally precedent to cultural values. We therefore ran our analysis
according to this alternative theoretical perspective while specifying cultural values and trust as the
mediating variable and primary independent variable, respectively, in the model. We found that only one
path was significant – that of trust in the energy industry influencing benefit-risk perceptions via
egalitarianism (β = -0.019, p<0.05). Furthermore, this effect is much smaller than the one based on our
proposed model (β = +0.062, p<0.05). This provides strong support for our original model as specified.
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There was no relationship between egalitarianism and trust in the government, thus trust in the
government has no mediating effect on the relationship between egalitarianism and benefit-risk
perceptions of HVPL installation.

5.2 Individualism, Trust and HVPL Benefit-Risk Perceptions
For the relationship between individualism and HVPL benefit-risk perceptions, we found a statistically
significant mediating effect of trust in the energy industry and distrust in environmental groups and
government agencies, as presented in Table V and Figure 1.
Individualism is positively related to trust in the energy industry (β = +0.122, p<0.05), but
inversely associated with trust in environmental groups (β = -0.194, p<0.05) and government (β = -0.131,
p<0.05), while trust in energy industry, environmental groups, and government, in turn, holds negative (β
= -0.279, p<0.05), positive (β = +0.326, p<0.05), and negative (β = -0.158, p<0.05) relationship with HVPL
risk perceptions, respectively, as discussed earlier. As such, it can be said that a statistically significant
indirect effect of individualism on HVPL risk perceptions is established via trust in energy industry (β = 0.034, p<0.05) and distrust in environmental groups (β = -0.068, p<0.05) and government (β = +0.021,
p<0.05), as reported in Table V.

5.3 Hierarchism, Trust and HVPL Benefit-Risk Perceptions
For the relationship between hierarchism and HVPL benefit-risk perceptions, we found a significant
mediating effect of trust in the energy industry and trust in the government, as presented in Table V and
Figure 1.
Hierarchism is positively related to trust in the energy industry (β = +0.324, p<0.05), while trust in
the energy industry is negatively related to the benefit-risk index (β = -0.279, p<0.05), which allows us to
infer that there is a negative indirect effect of hierarchism on perceived risk of HVPL through trust in the
energy industry (β = -0.090, p<0.05).
Additionally, Hierarchism is positively associated with trust in the government (β = +0.217,
p<0.05), while trust in the government is inversely associated with the benefit-risk index (β = -0.158,
p<0.05), indicating that trust in information from the government significantly mediates the effect of
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hierarchism on benefit-risk perceptions, with an indirect effect of hierarchism on perceived HVPL risk to
be statistically significantly negative (β = -0.034, p<0.05), as reported in Table V. There were no other
significant mediating effects of trust sources (i.e., trust in environmental groups) on benefit-risk
perceptions for hierarchs.

5.4 Fatalism, Trust and HVPL Benefit-Risk Perceptions
As displayed in Table V and Figure 1, we found that trust in environmental groups and trust in
government both contribute to statistically significant indirect effects of fatalism on HVPL benefit-risk
perceptions. More specifically, fatalism is positively related to trust in environmental groups (β = +0.159,
p<0.05), which, in turn, is positively related to our benefit-risk index (β = +0.348, p<0.05), yielding an
indirect effect of fatalism on perceived risk of HVPL installation with a statistical significance (β = +0.055,
p<0.05). Similarly, fatalism is positively related to trust in government (β = +0.167, p<0.05), which is
negatively associated with the benefit-risk index (β = -0.158, p<0.05), resulting in a statistically significant
indirect effect of fatalism on benefit-risk perceptions of HVPL installation (β = -0.026, p<0.05). However,
trust in energy industry does not constitute any meaningful mediation effect on the relationship between
fatalism and HVPL benefit-risk perceptions.

6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Overall, this study demonstrates that the influence of cultural values on benefit-risk perceptions is partially
mediated through trust – or distrust – in various groups, when considered as information sources.
Specifically, in the case of HVPL installations in Arkansas, policy elites with a propensity for strong
egalitarianism perceive greater risk (as compared to benefits) due to their trust in information from
environmental groups and distrust in information from the energy industry, at least in part. Conversely,
policy elites with strong individualism tendencies perceive greater benefits (as compared to risks) of
HVPL installation due to their trust in information from the energy industry and distrust in environmental
groups. These relationships are somewhat muted due to individualists’ distrust in information provided by
the government. Policy elites possessing a worldview of strong hierarchism perceive greater benefits (as
compared to risks) in HVPL installation due to their trust in information from both the energy industry and
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the government. Policy elites with a solid fatalism orientation exhibit a more complex relationship, which
will be discussed in detail further below.
The results of this study provide significant implications for both theory and practice. Many
previous studies have shown that cultural value predispositions influence perceptions of risk across an
array of substantive domains (2,3,30). However, the causal mechanism through which this relationship
occurs has been under-specified, at best. Some recent experimental works grounded on cultural
cognition of risks (28,49–51) have reported that the cultural values of individuals– as information
receivers – and their perceived congruence with those values held by expert information providers
interact to influence individuals’ perceptions of expert credibility (49) and, ultimately, their risk perceptions
(51). In the present research, we demonstrated that cultural value predispositions do not always affect
perceptions of risk directly. Furthermore, our analysis shows that there are no significant effects derived
from the interaction between individuals’ cultural values and their trust in information sources on risk
perceptions. Instead, we found that individuals’ intrinsic values appear to lead to different levels of trust
toward information sources, ultimately influencing their judgments regarding the relative risks and
benefits. One possible explanation for these disparate findings – in terms of an interactive versus causal
influence – could be found in the difference in study designs. The experimental nature of previous works
may have inflated the establishment of statistical relationships by creating an artificial dichotomy of
cultural value fit by assigning distinctive cultural characteristics to expert information providers as part of
experimental treatment. Evaluating cultural value congruence, however, may not be as clear-cut in a real
world application, with individuals encountering more difficulty in inferring the intrinsic values of
information providers, and thus their level of trust in the providers. This may be particularly true when
multiple potential information providers are involved and the cultural values attached to these providers
are ambiguous (as compared to in an experimental design in which identifiers of cultural values are
manipulated as desired). Along with this line of argument, however, it is noteworthy that Brady and
Sniderman (65) found that individuals are generally quite accurate in determining policy preferences of
others, and thus with whom to align themselves, based on their political motivation. Likewise, attitudes
toward policy issues are often attributed to individuals based upon group membership (65,66). “In-group
bias” induces group members to display favoritism toward other group members (66,67) with shared
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group identities being formed easily even with low levels of available information (66,68). CT suggests
that cultural biases are shared through social relationships (29–32), ultimately forming culturally
distinctive groups with which individuals can identify. Combining these insights, we see that a source of
information (in our case the energy industry, environmental groups, and government) can be interpreted
by individuals as sharing – or not sharing – cultural values and therefore as being either in-group or outgroup members. This evaluation, in turn, leads to trust – or distrust – in the information provided by such
sources, particularly as related to a specific policy issue, such as HVPL installations. By explicating this
causal process, this study takes a step toward better understanding not only that cultural value
predispositions do affect judgments – specifically regarding benefit-risk perceptions – but understanding
how this is done. Considering our findings, there are at least two areas of important research to be
conducted to better comprehend how cultural value predispositions shape risk perceptions and related
policy decisions. First, future studies should examine whether there are other intervening variables (e.g.
perceived and actual knowledge, affect, personality characteristics, etc.) – aside from trust in information
sources – that mediate the relationship between cultural orientations and policy-relevant judgments
(including, but not limited to, benefit-risk perceptions). Second, future research should consider other
policy contexts in order to better understand not only how, but also when trust in information sources is
relevant. It is likely that, given a different policy issue, the roles of various dimensions of cultural value
predispositions would be weighted differently. Thus, there may be different mediating effects of these
sources of trust across issues in different policy domains. Additionally, the relevant sources of information
are likely to differ across issues. For example, benefit-risk perceptions associated with economic policy
issues are likely to include trust in businesses and business owners, while trust in environmental groups
would vary accordingly, particularly in terms of magnitude, depending on the specific economic policy
proposal. Considering research in these two areas will allow for a more accurate and nuanced
understanding of the role that cultural value predispositions and trust in information sources play in
benefit-risk perceptions and policy-making practices.
This research also provides valuable insights to our understanding of trust, both in terms of its
origin and its influence. As discussed, previous research examining the role of trust generally considers
trust as a primary independent variable, neglecting considerations of where the trust originates (44,69). In
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doing so, there is often an implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption that trust is based on previous
interactions between an individual and the trustee, or that the origin of a given level of trust is not
important. When considering the origin of trust, previous research has considered trust to be relatively
fluid in nature, derived from the context of the issue at hand (17). However, the current research provides
evidence that trust in information sources may very well be relatively stable within the issue domain, as
well as not derived from personal interactions between the individual and trustee. Instead, this research
provides evidence for the idea that cultural value predispositions provide a strong heuristic for evaluating
the trustworthiness of information based on its source.
Additionally, this study provides valuable information for cultural theory researchers in regards to
treatment of fatalists. Often, fatalists are completely ignored in studies utilizing cultural theory, as, at least
by theory, they are not expected to have any significant relationships with variables of interest (2–
4,21,30,70). However, this study sheds some light on what may be occurring with fatalists. As discussed
above, fatalism showed no direct relationship with perceptions of benefits and risks in HVPL installations,
as in the cases of individualism and hierarchism in our analysis. However, there were two significant
indirect effects mediated by trust in information sources (i.e., trust in environmental groups and trust in
government) on perceptions of benefit and risk. Since Baron and Kenny’s (62) article on mediation, many
have suggested that there does not need to be a significant relationship between the independent
variable and dependent variable for mediation to occur (62). In this study, we see one of the justifications
for why this relationship is not necessary. Fatalism has two significant mediations associated with it – one
positive and one negative. Ultimately, these competing mediations wash out any effect that fatalism has
on benefit-risk perceptions. It would be beneficial for future studies to further investigate potential
intervening variables related to fatalism in order to parse out exactly what may be occurring within this
unique cultural group.
Finally, in regard to practical implications, this study highlights the importance of both the role and
power of trust in shaping policy elites’ perceptions of benefits and risks. Specifically, this study
demonstrates how the source of information shapes a policy elite’s benefit-risk assessments, particularly
based on the trust that the policy elite has towards the provider of that information. More importantly, we
found that, at least to some extent, it is not the accuracy of the information that is important to the policy
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elite, but whether the source of information is perceived to be congruent with that individual’s cultural
value predispositions. Thus, when considering an egalitarian, for instance, providing information
originating from the energy industry in an effort to persuade the policy elite to accept the installation of
HVPLs would be unwise and likely counterproductive, regardless of the quality and accuracy of the
information. This study provides evidence that, even for policy elites, decisions are not necessarily made
solely based on “purely objective and rational” cognitive processes, but through culturally biased
heuristics in regards to trust in information sources. This finding yields further insight as to how to design
more effective communication strategy when risk perceptions are a major source of policy controversies.
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Table I. Dependent Variable and Measures
Variable

Perceived
Benefit/Risk
associated
with HVPL

Measure
How much benefit do you think the installation of high voltage power lines in northwest
Arkansas would bring to your local government and community in the forms of energy
supply stability and reliability? (0=Not at all beneficial to 10= Extremely beneficial)*
How much benefit do you think the installation of high voltage power lines in northwest
Arkansas would bring to your local government and community in the form of efficient
energy transmission? (0=Not at all beneficial to 10= Extremely beneficial)*
How much benefit do you think the installation of high voltage power lines in northwest
Arkansas would bring to your local government and community in the form of new
economic opportunities and job creation? (0=Not at all beneficial to 10= Extremely
beneficial)*
How much benefit do you think the installation of high voltage power lines in northwest
Arkansas would bring to your local government and community in the form of provision
of structure for renewable energy sources? (0=Not at all beneficial to 10= Extremely
beneficial)*
How much benefit do you think the installation of high voltage power lines in northwest
Arkansas would bring to your local government and community in the form of efficient
land use? (0=Not at all beneficial to 10= Extremely beneficial)*
How much benefit do you think the installation of high voltage power lines in northwest
Arkansas would bring to your local government and community in the form of
necessary services maintained during post-disaster or high energy demand periods?
(0=Not at all beneficial to 10= Extremely beneficial)*
How much risk do you think the installation of high voltage power lines in northwest
Arkansas would pose to your local government and community in the form of
environmental degradation from clear-cutting trees for power line installation? (0=No
risk to 10=Extreme risk)
How much risk do you think the installation of high voltage power lines in northwest
Arkansas would pose to your local government and community in the form of
pesticide/herbicide use for securing power lines? (0=No risk to 10=Extreme risk)
How much risk do you think the installation of high voltage power lines in northwest
Arkansas would pose to your local government and community in the form of
decreasing property values in affected areas? (0=No risk to 10=Extreme risk)
How much risk do you think the installation of high voltage power lines in northwest
Arkansas would pose to your local government and community in the form of threats to
tourism (and/or other related industries)? (0=No risk to 10=Extreme risk)
How much risk do you think the installation of high voltage power lines in northwest
Arkansas would pose to your local government and community in the form of negative
health impacts due to electromagnetic field emission? (0=No risk to 10=Extreme risk)

HVPL
benefit-risk Index of above eleven items (α=0.92)
index**
* Reverse-coded
** Higher score indicates higher risk and lower benefits perceived.
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Table II. Primary Independent Variables and Measures
Variable

Egalitarianism

Egalitarianism
index

Individualism

Individualism
index

Hierarchism

Hierarchism
index

Fatalism

Fatalism index

Measure
Society works best if power is shared equally. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly
agree)
It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the
poor. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more
equal. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Index using factor score of above three items (α=0.78)

We are all better off when we compete as individuals. (1=Strongly disagree to
7=Strongly agree)
Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the
world.(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people
succeed or fail on their own. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Index using factor score of above three items (α=0.67)

Society is in trouble because people do not obey those in authority. (1=Strongly
disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
The best way to get ahead in life is to do what you are told to do to the best of your
abilities. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on
those who break the rules. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Index using factor score of above three items (α=0.68)

For the most part, succeeding in life is a matter of chance. (1=Strongly disagree to
7=Strongly agree)
No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is largely determined by forces
beyond our control. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Most of the important things that take place in life happen by random chance.
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Index using factor score of above three items (α=0.72)
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Table III. Mediator Variables and Measures
Variable

Trust in energy industry
Trust in environmental
groups
Trust in government

Measure
How trustworthy is information about policy issues, such as sustainable
energy and high voltage power lines, from energy industry?
(0=Not at all trustworthy to 10=Completely trustworthy)
How trustworthy is information about policy issues, such as sustainable
energy and high voltage power lines, from environmental conservation
groups? (0=Not at all trustworthy to 10=Completely trustworthy)
How trustworthy is information about policy issues, such as sustainable
energy and high voltage power lines, from government agencies?
(0=Not at all trustworthy to 10=Completely trustworthy)
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Table IV. Control Variables and Measures
Variable

Level of
knowledge
of energy
issues

Knowledge
index

Measure
Most scientists and energy experts agree that the estimates for natural gas reserves in
the U.S. have increased since 2001. (0=False; 1=True*)
Coal-fired electric power plants in Arkansas supply almost three quarters of the state’s
electricity. (0=False*; 1=True)
There has been a state decision on the prospective placement of high voltage power
lines in Northwest Arkansas. (0=False; 1=True*)
A state legislation has been proposed to prevent the prospective installation of high
voltage power lines in either Arkansas or Missouri. (0=False; 1=True*)
Independent power producers provide about a quarter of net electricity generation in
Arkansas. (0=False; 1=True*)
th
Arkansas recently ranked 17 in the nation in terms of total energy consumed per capita.
(0=False; 1=True*)
Biomass supplied all of Arkansas’ non-hydroelectric renewable energy resources for
electricity generation in 2010. (0=False; 1=True*)
Most scientists agree that electromagnetic fields from high voltage power lines can
increase the risk of leukemia among those living in their proximity. (0=False*; 1=True)
Index of above eight items (i.e., number of correct answers)

Race
Gender
Age

1=Non-Hispanic White
1=Male
Age in years
Level of education (1=Elementary through some high school to 7=Doctorate (of any
Education
type))
Income
Total estimated annual household income (1=less than $50,000 to 4=$150,000 or more)
* Correct answer
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Table V. Mediation Analysis Results Based On Methods Suggested By Preacher and Hayes (60, 61)

X
M
Y
c (XY)
a (XM)
SE(a)
b (MY)
SE(b)
ab
SE(ab)
Egalitarianism
0.106*
-0.223*
0.059
-0.279*
0.058
0.062*
0.023
Individualism
-0.047
0.122*
0.060
-0.279*
0.058
-0.034*
0.020
Trust in
energy industry
Hierarchism
-0.055
0.324*
0.060
-0.279*
0.058
-0.090*
0.025
Fatalism
0.046
0.104
0.058
-0.279*
0.058
-0.029
0.018
Egalitarianism
0.106*
0.326*
0.057
0.348*
0.057
0.114*
0.027
Trust in
HVPL
Individualism
-0.047
-0.194*
0.058
0.348*
0.057
-0.068*
0.021
environmental
benefit-risk
Hierarchism
-0.055
-0.066
0.058
0.348*
0.057
-0.023
0.020
groups
perceptions
Fatalism
0.046
0.159*
0.056
0.348*
0.057
0.055*
0.021
Egalitarianism
0.106*
0.024
0.063
-0.158*
0.055
-0.004
0.011
Individualism
-0.047
-0.131*
0.063
-0.158*
0.055
0.021*
0.012
Trust in
government
Hierarchism
-0.055
0.217*
0.064
-0.158*
0.055
-0.034*
0.015
Fatalism
0.046
0.167*
0.061
-0.158*
0.055
-0.026*
0.013
Note: *p<0.05; In the first row of this table, X, M, and Y denote the primary independent variable, the mediator variable, and the dependent
variable, respectively. The arrow represents a causal relationship between two variables. For instance, XY means X causes Y. Small
characters c, a, and b represent standardized regression coefficients for the causal relationships presented in the adjacent parenthesis. More
specifically, c (XY), a (XM), and b (MY) can be interpreted as the effect of X on Y, the effect of X on M, and the effect of M on Y,
respectively. SE denotes the standard error of the coefficient estimation. For instance, SE(a) means standard error of a. The indirect effect of
X on Y (mediated by M), ab, is calculated by a*b, and its standard error, SE(ab), is calculated based upon the methods suggested by
Preacher and Hayes (60, 61).
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Figure 1. Triadic Relationships between Cultural Values, Trust, and HVPL Benefit-Risk Perceptions
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Appendix I. Demographic Characteristics of Arkansas Local Policy Elite Sample Compared to
General Public In Arkansas and the United States

Characteristic

Arkansas Local Policy
Elites

Arkansas General
Public

The U.S. General
Public

Median Annual
Household Income

Between $70,000$80,000

Between $40,000$50,000

Between $50,000$60,000

Education Level
(% Bachelor’s
degree or higher)

74%

20%

29%

Race

94% White (NonHispanic)

74% White (NonHispanic)

63% White (NonHispanic)

Gender

61% Male

49% Male

49% Male

Source: Moyer and Song (2016, p.15)
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Appendix II. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Perceived Benefit/Risk associated
with HVPL
Egalitarianism
Individualism
Hierarchism
14
Fatalism
Trust in energy industry
Trust in environmental groups
Trust in government
15
Knowledge
Age
Education
Income

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

311

5.57

2.88

0

10

306
306
306
306
117
117
117
255
420
287
286

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.86
4.79
5.29
3.11
53.91
4.56
2.40

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
2.50
2.60
2.15
1.31
13.45
1.4
0.93

-2.71
-2.54
-2.30
-1.78
0
0
0
0
22
2
1

2.50
2.18
2.93
2.97
10
10
10
6
87
7
4

14

The descriptive statistics for the four cultural worldviews are based on our factor analysis of the 12
cultural value items and are thus mean-centered at 0 with a standard deviation of 1 and are determined
based on all 12 survey items. The means and standard deviations for each of the cultural values based
on the three survey questions related to the particular cultural group are as follows: Egalitarianism: Mean
= 3.6, SD = 1.65; Individualism: Mean = 3.95, SD = 1.4; Hierarchism: Mean = 3.6, SD = 1.45; Fatalism:
Mean = 2.53, SD = 1.21.
15
One reviewer commented that the mean knowledge scores are low, particularly considering the elite
sample should, theoretically, be more knowledgeable on the HVPL issue. We suspect three potential
reasons for this: 1) the questions were too difficult 2) individuals in the sample were not actually
concerned about the HVPL issue and 3) individuals in the sample are concerned about the HVPL issue,
but have low levels of knowledge about it. However, mainly due to the design of the current study, we are
unable to parse out the potential causes or outcomes that may be associated with these knowledge
scores.
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Appendix III. Frequency Table
Variable
Race
Gender

n
284
337

Non-White (9%)
Female (35%)
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Category (%)
Non-Hispanic White (91%)
Male (65%)

0.278***

0.046

-0.203***

-0.128**

0.278***

c (XY)

-0.194***

0.326***

0.104*

0.324***

0.122**

-0.223***

a (XM)

0.058

0.058

0.057

0.058

0.060

0.060

0.059

SE(a)

0.355***

0.355***

0.355***

0.355***

-0.375***

-0.375***

-0.375***

-0.375***

b (MY)

0.058

0.061

0.061

0.061

0.061

0.058

0.058

0.058

0.058

SE(b)

0.027*

-0.005

0.056***

-0.023

-0.069***

0.116***

-0.039*

-0.121***

-0.046*

0.084***

ab

0.018

0.015

0.013

0.022

0.021

0.024

0.028

0.023

0.029

0.023

0.026

SE(ab)

0.081

-0.157***

-0.155***

0.283***

-0.010

-0.179***

-0.059

0.162***

0.085

-0.082

-0.082

0.194***

c' (XY)'

-76%

22%

-21%

-2%

123%

12%

54%

42%

-85%

60%

36%

% Effect
30%

Appendix IV. Mediation Analysis Results Based On Methods Suggested By Baron & Kenny (1986) and Sobel (1982)

-0.128**
-0.066

0.056

-0.209***

0.058

-0.045**

0.016

Individualism

Hierarchism

Individualism
Hierarchism
Fatalism
Egalitarianism
Individualism
Hierarchism

Trust in
environmental
groups

Trust in
government

Y

-0.203***

0.159***

0.063

-0.209***

0.058

-0.035**

M

0.046

0.024

0.063

-0.209***

0.058

X

0.278***

-0.131**

0.064

-0.209***

Egalitarianism

Fatalism

-0.128**

0.217***

0.061

Trust in
energy industry

Egalitarianism

-0.203***

0.167***

HVPL benefit-risk
perception

0.046

Fatalism

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; In the first row of this table, X, M, and Y denote the primary independent variable, the mediator variable, and
the dependent variable, respectively. The arrow represents a causal relationship between two variables. For instance, XY means X causes Y.
Small characters c, a, and b represent standardized regression coefficients for the causal relationships presented in the adjacent parenthesis.
More specifically, c (XY), a (XM), and b (MY) can be interpreted as the effect of X on Y (without modeling M on the right hand side of the
regression equation), also called the total effect, the effect of X on M, and the effect of M on Y, respectively. SE denotes the standard error of the
coefficient estimation. For instance, SE(a) means standard error of a. The indirect effect of X on Y (mediated by M), ab, is calculated by a*b, and
2
2
2
2
its standard error, SE(ab), is calculated by (b *(SE(a)) )+(a *(SE(b)) ), based upon the methods suggested by Sobel (1982). The direct effect of X
on Y, c’(XY)’, is calculated by c (XY), the total effect of X on Y, minus ab, the indirect effect of X on Y. % Effect represents the ratio of ab, the
indirect effect of X on Y, to c (XY), the total effect of X on Y, while bold font under this column shows those that are statistically significant at the
level of p<0.1.
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Knowledge Hubris and the Policy Process: A Comparison of the Origin of Inflated and Deflated
Knowledge Perceptions between Policy Elites and the General Public and Their Effects on the
Policy Process
By: Clayton Creed Tumlison and Geoboo Song

ABSTRACT: An important component of decision-making is knowledge. However, perceived knowledge
is not always aligned with actual knowledge. This disparity can be significant, affecting when an individual
seeks information regarding a particular policy issue. Utilizing a survey distributed to a sample of policy
elites and the general public, this study examines the origins of knowledge hubris – the difference
between an individual’s perceived and actual knowledge regarding a policy topic. We further examine
whether the origins of knowledge hubris differ between the general public and policy elites, as well as
how various levels of hubris influence perceptions of risks and benefits of hydraulic fracturing. We utilize
Cultural Theory (CT) to explain how hubris on a policy topic is rooted in the cultural worldviews –
specifically, hierarchism, fatalism, egalitarianism, and individualism – of both policy elites and the public.
We discuss the similarities and differences in the origins and levels of hubris between policy elites and
the public, as well as the implications of knowledge hubris among each of these groups – together and
separately – particularly focusing on the role that this hubris ultimately plays in the policymaking process.
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INTRODUCTION
Hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) is a relatively recently utilized technique for extracting from previously
inaccessible reserves of oil and gas (Boudet et al., 2014) that involves a pressure injection of a mixture
consisting of water, sand, and other chemicals through a previously horizontally drilled rock layer in order
to facilitate the flow of oil and gas by fracturing the rock (Boudet et al., 2014; Pye, 1973). Because of
these methods, increased gas and oil extraction has been enabled in previously inaccessible locations
around the world (Boudet et al., 2014; Clarke, Evensen, Jacquet, & Stedman, 2012; Walser, Pursell, &
others, 2007) and is expected to make the United States a net exporter of natural gas in the near future,
with the share of production attributed to shale gas increasing from 23% to 49% by the year 2035 (Boudet
et al., 2014).
According to supporters, fracking will lead to many positive outcomes, including increased
economic growth, a more secure domestic energy supply, and a decreased reliance on electricity
generation that is coal-based and carbon intensive (Boudet et al., 2014; Considine, Watson, & Blumsack,
2010; Hultman, Rebois, Scholten, & Ramig, 2011). However, the benefits proposed by fracking
supporters are not without debate. While fracking is suggested to benefit local communities via expanding
local business opportunities, increased job opportunities for residents, and increasing local tax revenues
(Boudet et al., 2014; Kay, 2011), there may be strains placed on community infrastructures due to an
influx of workers and industry into the community (Boudet et al., 2014; Jacquet, 2009). Additionally, the
fracking process requires 2-10 million gallons of water per fracture (Boudet et al., 2014; Soeder & Kappel,
2009), potentially creating issues regarding water availability and access within communities. Further, the
water used for the fracking process may contaminate the local water supply via chemical spills,
inadequate treatment of wastewater, and aquifer contamination of methane released from the gas wells
(Boudet et al., 2014; Kargbo, Wilhelm, & Campbell, 2010). As such, both federal and state agencies have
issued fracking related regulations (Boudet et al., 2014; Groeger, 2012). The increased potential strains
on community infrastructures due to fracking has also been suggested to lead to higher stress levels,
decreased cohesion in the community, and a changing of the community character with the influx of
employment-seekers to the community, increasing social problems (Boudet et al., 2014; Brasier et al.,
2011; Kester et al. 2015; Heikkila et al. 2015)
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With the relative newness of fracking operations in the United States, and the contradictory views
regarding the benefits and risks associated with fracking practices, a better understanding of the
formation of related attitudes from both the perspective of the policy elites and the general public, two
important policy actors in the related policymaking process, is critical in comprehending fracking
policymaking. In doing so, we underscore the role that knowledge hubris – conceptualized here as the
degree of congruence between an individual’s perceived and actual knowledge levels on a given topic –
plays in the benefit-risk perceptions of fracking for both the general public and local policy elites. Further,
we examine the origins of knowledge hubris for each of these two groups, focusing on cultural value
predispositions.
We introduce this concept of knowledge hubris as, we argue, it is both a more informative and
relevant construct in terms of knowledge than either perceived or actual knowledge levels. From a
policymaking standpoint, we suspect that knowledge hubris provides more insight into the policy
reasoning of individual actors, both in terms of policy decision outcomes and the resulting acceptance, or
lack thereof, of the decisions. For example, an individual with high levels of perceived knowledge who
possesses a high level of actual knowledge as well is, we suspect, more likely to make a “better” decision
than another individual who has a similarly high level of perceived knowledge, but in actuality knows little
about the topic at hand. Both individuals may very well vigorously attempt to assert themselves into the
policy process due to their perceived expertise, but the outcomes associated with each individual’s
thought processes are likely to be quite divergent. Conversely, an individual who has low levels of
perceived knowledge on a topic may refrain from the policymaking process. However, if this individual’s
actual knowledge levels are high, they are precisely the type of individual whose participation would
advance the policy process.
In summary, in this paper, we attempt to examine the role of cultural value predispositions in
determining levels of knowledge hubris and the resulting perceptions of risks and benefits associated with
fracking operations, particularly focusing on similarities and differences between local policy elites and the
general public. We first provide a theoretical discussion and literature review, leading to our conjectures.
We then discuss our methodology, specifically focusing on our analysis and a discussion of the results.
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We end by discussing the implications of the current research, focusing on both theoretical and practical
considerations, as well as directions for future research.

THEORIES AND CONJECTURES
In the following sections we provide a theoretical discussion and literature review in order to develop our
conjectures. This research is focused on three key areas of interest: examining antecedents to knowledge
hubris, particularly focusing on the role cultural value predispositions play in the context of fracking policy,
examining the role of knowledge hubris in determining benefit-risk perceptions of fracking, and comparing
the general public with local policy elites regarding these questions. As such, we next provide a
discussion on demographics, cultural value predispositions, knowledge hubris, and political sophistication
in order to frame the current study.

Demographics
Demographic characteristics, particularly gender and race, have been shown to influence the risk
perceptions of individuals. The so-called “white male effect” has been consistently found in studies of risk
perceptions. Males consistently perceive lower risk levels than females in the domain of environmental
health threats (Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994). Additionally, across a variety of risk domains, white
individuals tend to perceive lower levels of risk compared to their non-white counterparts (Finucane,
Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield, 2000). Not only are these differences in risk perceptions found
amongst the general public, but have also been demonstrated to exist among scientists, who are
assumed to be more rational in their decision making due to having relatively sophisticated levels of
expertise and scientific knowledge. For example, in the domain of nuclear risks, male scientists have
been found to exhibit significantly lower levels of perceived risk than females (Barke, Jenkins-Smith, &
Slovic, 1997). It is suggested that white males (in the United States), tend to hold a unique value identity
based on individualism and hierarchism. In turn, attitudes more accommodating to risk-taking, particularly
in the science and technology utilization domains, are held which reinforce their worldview of both an
ecological system that is resilient and market-oriented entrepreneurship (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, &
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Braman, 2011). We similarly expect such demographic-based variations in benefit-risk assessments of
fracking in both the general public and local policy elites.
In terms of knowledge hubris, demographic characteristics have been found to be correlated with
inflated self-estimations. Males, as compared to females, self-estimate their IQ scores as higher.
Interestingly, this appears to be due not to inflated IQ estimations of males, but deflated estimations of
females (Furnham & Rawles, 1999).

Cultural Theory of Risk Perception
As our primary dependent variable in this study is perceptions of benefits and risks of fracking, we utilize
Cultural Theory (Swedlow, 2011; Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990), which suggests that the way we
perceive and act in the world is shaped by the organization of our social relationships (Ney & Verweij,
2014). Perceptions of risks are, then, derived from responses to threats to the preferred ‘way of life’ or
‘cultural worldview’ of an individual, as opposed to being necessarily associated with the technical
aspects of the issue. Instead, controversy regarding risks derives from an ongoing debate over the ways
a society should act and function (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic, & Mertz,
2007).
Grid-group Cultural Theory (CT) suggests that cultural biases are shared through social relations,
which reflect shared attitudes and worldviews across socially constructed systems (Thompson et al.,
1990). An individual’s behavior, particularly the attention paid to various types of risks and their risk-taking
preferences in various domains, is derived from these biases (Thompson et al., 1990). A typology
consisting of four primary cultural worldviews (egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism, fatalism) stems
from two dimensions – grid and group. Grid refers to the extent to which the behavior of the individual is
constrained by role differentiation, wherein grid constraints are higher as roles are prescribed and lower
when roles are chosen (Ney & Verweij, 2014). Group, on the other hand, refers to the extent to which
individuals are bound to a certain social group (Ney & Verweij, 2014; Thompson et al., 1990). The four
worldviews function together as a system, with each worldview “contradistinct” to the others. These
distinctions allow for an individual’s cultural biases to be reinforced via the distinctions between the other
worldviews and their own (Thompson et al., 1990). These resulting interactions provide distinct
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perspectives and values related to economic systems and views of nature between the various cultural
groups (Thompson et al., 1990).
Egalitarians (low grid-high group) are strongly bound to their social group while lacking role
differentiation. Group cohesion is reinforced by distrust in authority, and fairness and equity in distribution
are highly valued (Thompson et al., 1990). Additionally, egalitarians tend to perceive higher levels of risk,
especially in the areas of economic growth and technological development, as these two areas are
perceived to be threatening to nature, which is viewed as easily damaged due to its fragility. As such,
experimentation with nature must be avoided in an effort to manage nature carefully – a necessity from
the perspective of an egalitarian (Dake, 1992; Lachapelle, Montpetit, & Gauvin, 2014; Thompson et al.,
1990).
Individualists (low grid-low group) view risk as opportunity and are not bound by either rules or social
groups, often preferring a libertarian society (Thompson et al., 1990). Competition among everyone,
regardless of status or advantage, is believed to be what creates the best functioning society, with
individuals failing or succeeding on their own merits. Therefore, individualists dislike external control, as it
violates the free competition that they value. Economically, individualists are focused on wealth creation,
while viewing nature as robust and able to maintain equilibrium on its own. Thus, experimentation is
acceptable regarding nature, as it allows the pursuit of the “best possible” outcomes (Dake, 1992;
Lachapelle et al., 2014; Thompson et al., 1990).
Hierarchs (high grid-high group) view social order as being maintained by both institutional and social
rules, thus placing value on both. Risks are often acceptable, with experts viewed as central in guiding
the direction of society. Similar to individualists, hierarchs place focus on wealth creation. However,
obeying authority is seen as a key means toward success. As such, hierarchs believe that punishment for
rule breakers should be swift and severe. Regarding nature, hierarchs are again similar to individualists,
viewing it as tolerant and robust to manipulations. However, distinct from individualists, hierarchs believe
that nature is subject to occasional events that can disrupt this equilibrium and thus view regulations to
prevent these potential disasters as necessary due to the desire for a future that is predictable based on
expert evaluation (Dake, 1992; Lachapelle et al., 2014; Thompson et al., 1990).
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Fatalists (high grid-low group) lack belief in their ability to control the situations they face, being at the
mercy of fate. They are excluded from social groups, but bound by social constructs. Unsurprisingly,
nature is viewed by fatalists as unpredictable, with outcomes predicated on chance (Dake, 1992;
Lachapelle et al., 2014; Thompson et al., 1990).

Knowledge Hubris
Decision-making is affected in various ways by both perceived and actual knowledge (e.g. Jaccard,
Dodge, & Guilamo-Ramos, 2005; Rock, Ireland, & Resnick, 2003). While both actual and perceived
knowledge have been often examined, there is a dearth of research regarding the discrepancy between
the two. This discrepancy, we argue, is likely to serve as a more informative construct than the
examination of the two individual components, potentially explaining some of the conflicting and/or
inconsistent results found in the literature regarding actual and perceived knowledge and their effects on
various outcomes.
There are two traditionally utilized ways to measure knowledge on an issue – assessing an
individual’s self-perceptions of their own knowledge and measuring an individual’s knowledge level on a
topic via a series of questions about the topic (Stoutenborough & Vedlitz, 2014). However, while often
correlated, these two forms of measurement do not provide consistent and similar results in terms of
explaining information seeking and decision making behaviors and perceived decision outcomes (Raju,
Lonial, & Mangold, 1995). In the climate change arena, Stoutenborough & Vedlitz (2014) found that those
with higher levels of perceived knowledge were not more likely to be concerned about climate change.
However, those with higher levels of measured actual knowledge had higher concern levels regarding
climate change. Perceived knowledge regarding birth control use, independent of actual knowledge, has
been demonstrated to increase the likelihood of pregnancy (Jaccard et al., 2005). These two examples,
one finding that actual knowledge, while not perceived knowledge, is associated with risk perspectives
and the other finding that riskier behaviors are associated with higher levels of perceived knowledge,
demonstrate the unexplored role of knowledge, particularly the interaction between these two types of
knowledge, on outcomes.
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In examining consumer decision-making, the marketing field has offered some insights into why
there may be differences in outcomes associated with actual and perceived knowledge. Dodd, Laverie,
Wilcox, and Duhan (2005) find that consumers making wine purchases use different sources of
information based on their actual and perceived knowledge levels. Those with high levels of actual
knowledge tended to use impersonal information sources, such as wine guides and reviews, to make
their purchase decisions, while those who had higher levels of perceived knowledge, in addition to
impersonal sources, tended to use their own preferences and discount personal sources such as friends
and sales personnel. Satisfaction with the quality of purchase decisions has also been found to be
attributed to higher perceived knowledge levels, but not higher actual knowledge levels (Raju et al.,
1995). It is argued that perceived level of knowledge, compounded by factors in the surrounding
environment, is the catalyst for information seeking behavior. The mechanism by which this occurs is an
effort to participate in self-consistent behavior (Moorman, Diehl, Brinberg, & Kidwell, 2004).
The previous discussion has focused on the roles types of knowledge play in determining
outcomes, as well as mechanisms by which these relationships occur. Additionally, previous work has
examined antecedents relevant to our concept of knowledge hubris. Particularly, expertise and
experience tend to significantly lead to an inflated sense of capabilities. This expert overconfidence is
exhibited across a range of domains including estimating the number of moves that could be recalled in a
game of chess, (Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1981), card trading (List & Mason, 2011), and American football
draft selection (Massey & Thaler, 2005). However, this overconfidence may not always be problematic.
Johnson and Fowler (2011) argue that more complete decision rules can be outperformed by
overconfident beliefs when those beliefs prove more economical, readily available, or faster. Particularly
related to the current study is the finding that political elites are prone to being overconfident (Johnson &
Fowler, 2011; Lin & Bier, 2008; Massey & Thaler, 2005; Tetlock, 2005), making them more likely to exhibit
knowledge hubris as compared to the general public.

Political Sophistication, Local Policy Elites, and the General Public
Political sophistication – “the process of gaining and ultimately possessing expertise in one or more
domains of political thinking” (Lieberman, Schreiber, & Ochsner, 2003, p. 685) is a common approach to
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public opinion research and is argued to be the result of political knowledge that is highly differentiated,
integrated, and organized (Campbell, 1980; Converse, 1964; Luskin, 1990). Political belief systems are
argued to be more coherent as political knowledge increases in range and scope (Carpini & Keeter,
1997). Thus, when low levels of political sophistication exist, political belief systems are inconsistent,
which prevents coherent and consistent policy preferences from being developed (Carpini & Keeter,
1997; Converse, 1964; Michaud, Carlisle, & Smith, 2009; Stimson, 1975; Zaller, 1992). Indeed, political
sophistication has been shown to increase the relationship between political orientations and policy
positions (Carpini & Keeter, 1997; Goren, 2004; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991; Zaller, 1992).
However, it is also argued that political sophistication is not necessary for the development of
coherent policy preferences, but instead core values and beliefs that function as cognitive heuristics and
allow for individuals with low levels of political sophistication to make political judgments without
expending the additional costs associated with information search while still being able to hold consistent
and coherent political belief systems regardless of their level of political sophistication (Goren, 2004;
Popkin, 1994). Among the general public cultural value orientations have indeed been shown to represent
a set of intrinsic values that, in turn, influence and predict policy preferences and political attitudes distinct
from the effects of ideology. Importantly, this holds true irrespective of sophistication levels (Ripberger,
Song, Nowlin, Jones, & Jenkins-Smith, 2012).
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to consider the potential distinctions between local
policy elites and the general public, particularly as related to political sophistication and decision-making.
We can expect that local policy elites, by their position, are relatively politically sophisticated, particularly
as compared to the general population. Political elites are different from the general public
demographically, tending to have higher education, more knowledge regarding politics, and higher
incomes (Edinger & Searing, 1967; Griffin, 2013; Jennings, 1992; Lawless & Fox, 2005). Further, the
strength and consistency of their political attitudes is also higher than that of the general public
(Converse, 1964; Hetherington, 2001), supporting the argument that elites are not only distinct from the
general public demographically, but likely in their levels of political sophistication, as well.
Because of their position and power, elites gain experience in the political process as compared
to the general public, making them more politically sophisticated and thus likely affecting how they make
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decisions (Chin, Bond, & Geva, 2000). Indeed, as compared to the general public, elites have been
empirically shown to have greater levels of sophistication (Lieberman et al., 2003). Further, evidence
suggests that elites differ from the general population in terms of the ways they think and make decisions.
For example, Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro (2001) found that elites make judgments utilizing
neoclassical economic reasoning, whereas the general public tended to utilize neorealist or Rawlsian
lines of reasoning in their decision-making regarding international trade. Due to experience, elites also
tend to be less averse to losses than the general public (Haigh & List, 2005; Plott & Zeiler, 2007). In
complex situations, experts have been found to make better use of heuristics in decision-making
(Feltovich, Prietula, & Ericsson, 2006; Mintz, 2004; Zimmerman & Campillo, 2003) as well as to be closer
to meeting the rational actor assumption.
While research demonstrates that elites are different from the general public in terms of their
decision-making process, there is debate as to why this is the case. Griffin (2013) argues that it is not a
distinction in the decision-making processes of elites versus the general public, but instead a function of
the roles of the two groups. Indeed, he found that when information was readily available, elected officials
and the general public did not utilize different decision-making processes, supporting the contention that
there is no significant difference between the two groups in terms of decision-making processes, at least
under equal decision-making environments.
Another relevant consideration for the current research regarding differences between elites and
the general public is associated specifically with risk perceptions. Knowledge levels of individuals
regarding sources of risk and danger have been suggested to explain why risks and benefits are
perceived differently across individuals (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). According to this idea, more accurate
and objective evaluations regarding potential risks can be made by those who are more knowledgeable
than others. Often examined in the context of differences between experts and the general public, this
“knowledge thesis” has received mixed support. Significant differences in risk perceptions between elites
and the general public have been found in several domains such as biotechnology, chemicals, and
nanotechnology (Kraus, Malmfors, & Slovic, 1992; Savadori et al., 2004; Siegrist, Cousin, Kastenholz, &
Wiek, 2007). However, claims of issues related to methodological validity argue that legitimate support of
this distinction between the two groups is minimal, at best (Rowe & Wright, 2001).
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Conjectures
The focus of the current study is the examination of the origins of knowledge hubris and its role in benefit
risk perceptions in the general public and in local policy elites. Because the issues surrounding fracking
operations and policy are oriented around competing perceptions of risks and benefits, particularly in the
environmental and economic domains, we expect that the cultural values held by an individual will
significantly predict perceptions of risks and benefits associated with fracking.
Egalitarians, particularly in the technological development and economic growth domains, tend to
perceive high levels of risk (Thompson et al., 1990), largely because of their view of nature as fragile and
easily damaged. We therefore expect egalitarians to perceive higher levels of risks as compared to
benefits. Conversely, both individualists and hierarchs view nature as relatively robust, particularly when
compared to egalitarians, and are accepting of risks (Thompson et al., 1990). We therefore expect both
individualists and hierarchs to perceive greater benefits as compared to risks. We expect no particular
relationship with benefit-risk perceptions for fatalists, as they tend to view outcomes as matters of chance.
We expect these relationships to hold for both local policy elites and the general public.
We also anticipate significant relationships between cultural value predispositions and knowledge
hubris. Identity-protective cognition (Kahan et al., 2007) suggests that the well-being of a group member
may be threatened via a loss of self-esteem or status-acquiring opportunities when the values of the
group are challenged. This threat to group-held beliefs and values also represents a threat to the group
member’s identity, which is, in large part, a product of group memberships. In order to protect their
identity, individuals assess information in a way that reinforces those beliefs that are associated with
membership within a group (Cohen et al., 2007; Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Kahan et al., 2007).
Further, risk assessments are found to be consistent with whether the cultural value oriented beliefs of
the group are threatened, including the areas of environmental risks, guns, and abortion (Kahan et al.,
2007). In line with this reasoning, we suggest that perceived knowledge represents a mechanism by
which an individual can attempt to protect their group-oriented identity. In the case of fracking, we expect
that egalitarians will hold higher levels of knowledge hubris, as fracking operations represent a threat to
the environment. For individualists, we expect a similar relationship with knowledge hubris, as fracking
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operations represent a free market and competition. Thus efforts to regulate fracking represent a violation
of these values. For hierarchs, we anticipate a negative relationship with knowledge hubris, as there is
not a particularly group-oriented identity that appears to be violated by the topic. Additionally, hierarchs
tend to prefer deferring to experts to guide decision-making, again minimizing the need to protect an
identity based on knowledge.
In considering the role of knowledge hubris on benefit-risk perceptions, we expect several
significant relationships. We expect knowledge hubris to partially mediate the relationship between
cultural values and benefit-risk perceptions, particularly for egalitarians and individualists, who we have
suggested will be engaged in a process of identity-protective cognition.
We anticipate these proposed relationships will be consistent between the sample of local policy
elites and the general public. However, we do expect to find a difference in the strength of several of the
relationships. A key distinction between the general public and local policy elites is that of political
sophistication. As elites have been shown to have greater sophistication than the general public
(Lieberman et al., 2003) which increases the relationship between political orientations and policy
positions (Carpini & Keeter, 1997; Goren, 2004; Sniderman et al., 1991; Zaller, 1992) we expect the
relationship between cultural value orientations and benefit-risk perceptions to be stronger for local policy
elites than the general public, as the increased sophistication of the elites should make their attitudes
towards policy issues stronger and more coherent than those of the general public (Lee & Chang, 2010).
We similarly anticipate stronger relationships between cultural values and knowledge hubris for local
policy elites as compared to the general population. As discussed above, elites have tendencies to
express overconfidence, in addition to having more coherent and consistent ideological mental structures.
This combination should, we suggest, lead to higher levels of knowledge hubris for local policy elites as
compared to the general public. For the mediating role of knowledge hubris, however, we expect no
particular difference between local policy elites and the general public.

DATA, VARIABLES, AND MEASURES
Survey Data
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Between December 2015 and January 2016, we distributed a confidential survey to both local policy
elites and a representative sample of the general public in the states of Arkansas and Oregon,
constituting four separate statewide internet surveys. A total of 657 local policy elites in Arkansas and
Oregon responded to the survey. For the general public in the two states, a total of 1,049 individuals
responded.

We conceptualized policy elites as individuals who, at the local level, hold political resources and
the capability to potentially hold influence throughout the policy process, including agenda setting and
policy formulation, implementation, and feedback. Specifically, we focused on those individuals who are
likely to be involved in the policy process related to energy policy issues. Thus, the sample frame for the
policy elites consisted of city mayors, council members, clerks, and government officials, as well as
chamber of commerce members in cities across each state. This data set demonstrates distinct
differences between the general public and local policy elites (see Table 1), with policy elites being
generally more highly educated and having higher income. Further, local policy elites are more
predominately White males as compared to the sample of the general public.
(Table 1 about here)
Measuring Dependent Variable
The primary dependent variable of interest in this analysis is the perceived benefits and risks associated
with fracking that are held by policy elites and the general public. This was measured by a single 7 point
Likert-type question asking participants how they rated the overall balance of risks and benefits
associated with fracking, anchored at 1 (risks far outweigh benefits) and 7 (benefits far outweigh risks).
We utilized this single item in order to capture the heuristic evaluation of risks and benefits associated
with fracking on the whole, without breaking it down into its potential component parts.

Measuring Independent Variables and Mediator
We utilize the individual’s cultural value predispositions (i.e. egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchism,
and fatalism) as our primary independent variables. We employed a previously validated scale (Herron &
Jenkins-Smith, 2014; Jones & Song, 2014; Ripberger, Gupta, Silva, & Jenkins-Smith, 2014; Song, 2014;
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Song, Silva, & Jenkins-Smith, 2014) of twelve survey items to measure cultural values (Table 2). Each of
the four cultural worldviews was measured by a subset of three survey items. The survey respondents
were provided with the twelve statements relating to their cultural orientations and were asked to rate
their level of agreement with each of the items, which were evaluated on a seven-point scale anchored at
1 (=Strongly disagree) to 7 (=Strongly agree). We conducted a factor analysis and optimized the four
factor solution from the responses to these twelve items. Each of the three subsets of items loaded onto
one of the four latent dimensions. These dimensions and their loadings matched the theoretical
definitions of Cultural Theory’s four proposed cultural orientations. We then calculated factor scores for
each dimension based on this factor analysis. These scores were used as an index measuring the
cultural orientations of each respondent. Each set of three CT items exhibited acceptable reliability with
Chronbach’s alpha scores ranging from 0.60 to 0.79.
(Table 2 about here)
Our mediation variable, knowledge hubris, was calculated via subtracting the actual knowledge
scores for each respondent from their perceived knowledge scores. Actual knowledge scores were
calculated based on a set of seven “True” or “False” questions pertaining to energy and fracking issues in
their respective state and then converted into a percentage correct score. Perceived knowledge was
measured via two eight-point scale questions, each anchored at 0 (=Not at all informed) and 7
(=Completely informed). The first question asked respondents how well they were informed on energy
policy in general, particularly regarding fracking operations, and the second asked respondents how well
informed they were on issues regarding fracking operations. The responses to these two questions were
added together and converted into a percentage score. The actual knowledge percentage score was then
subtracted from the perceived knowledge percentage score to give us a single score indicating
knowledge hubris (see Table 3).
(Table 3 about here)
Measuring Control Variables
We utilized other variables that have been claimed by previous studies to influence benefit-risk
perceptions as control variables. Specifically, we included demographic characteristics such as age,
gender, race, income, and education. Additionally, we included a dummy variable for the state in which
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the respondent lived in order to control for any effects associated with any differences between the two
states (e.g. Arkansas having fracking operations whereas Oregon does not).

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
To test our hypotheses regarding the relationships between cultural orientations, knowledge hubris, and
fracking benefit-risk perceptions among local policy elites and the general public in Arkansas and Oregon,
we utilized a method for mediation analysis suggested by Preacher and Hayes (A. F. Hayes, 2013;
Preacher & Hayes, 2004). We estimated the effects of the cultural orientation variables on fracking
benefit-risk perceptions through knowledge hubris while controlling for demographics and state of
residence by utilizing the SPSS Macro MEDIATE. The MEDIATE macro is based on OLS regression and
assumes no interaction between the model’s independent variables and mediating variables (A. Hayes,
2014). We used MEDIATE to generate 1,000 random samples from the data to determine confidence
intervals at a 95% threshold (A. F. Hayes, 2013). All variables were standardized before analysis for
interpretability of results.
We calculated both the direct effects (effects of cultural orientations on fracking benefit-risk
perceptions while controlling for knowledge hubris and control variables) and indirect effects (effects of
cultural orientations on fracking benefit-risk perceptions carried through knowledge hubris) using SPSS
MEDIATE. MEDIATE calculates indirect effects with bootstrap estimates that use 1,000 samples pulled
from the data, computing the indirect effect for each of the 1,000 samples. An indirect effect of the CT
variables on benefit-risk perceptions via knowledge hubris is indicated when the confidence interval does
not contain zero.

Policy Elites, Cultural Values, Knowledge Hubris, and Fracking Benefit-Risk Perceptions
For the relationship between cultural value orientations and fracking benefit-risk perceptions among policy
elites, we found no mediating effect of knowledge hubris, as knowledge hubris was not significantly
associated with fracking benefit-risk perceptions. Our measure of egalitarianism is positively associated
with knowledge hubris (β = +0.132, p < 0.05) and negatively associated with fracking benefit-risk
perceptions (β = -0.412, p < 0.01), indicating that as egalitarianism scores increase, greater risks (as
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opposed to benefits) of fracking are perceived. Similarly, our measure of individualism was positively
associated with knowledge hubris (β = +0.134, p < 0.01). Opposite our measure of egalitarianism,
individualism was positively associated with fracking benefit-risk perceptions (β = +0.398, p < 0.01),
indicating that as individualism scores increase, greater benefits (as opposed to risks) of fracking are
perceived. Our measures of hierarchism and fatalism were not significantly associated with knowledge
hubris scores or fracking benefit-risk perceptions.
Overall, for policy elites, results indicate that, consistent with our predictions, cultural value
orientations – particularly egalitarianism and individualism – significantly predict fracking benefit-risk
perceptions, with egalitarians viewing fracking as being more risky, and individualists viewing fracking as
providing greater benefits. While both egalitarians and individualists exhibit significant positive
relationships with knowledge hubris, this knowledge hubris does not affect their judgments of fracking
benefits and risks.
(Figure 1 about here)
General Public, Cultural Values, Knowledge Hubris, and Fracking Benefit-Risk Perceptions
For the relationship between cultural value orientations and fracking benefit-risk perceptions among the
general public, we found significant mediating effects of knowledge hubris for egalitarians, individualists,
and hierarchs. As opposed to our sample of policy elites, knowledge hubris was significantly associated
with fracking benefit-risk perceptions (β = +0.118, p < 0.01). Our measure of egalitarianism is positively
associated with knowledge hubris (β = +0.089, p < 0.01) and negatively associated with fracking benefitrisk perceptions (β = -0.317, p < 0.01). Additionally, a significant indirect effect of egalitarianism on
fracking benefit-risk perceptions through knowledge hubris is indicated (β = +0.011, LLCI = 0.003, ULCI =
0.023). Our measure of individualism is positively associated with knowledge hubris (β = +0.066, p <
0.05) and positively associated with fracking benefit-risk perceptions (β = +0.261, p < 0.01). Additionally,
a significant indirect effect of individualism on fracking benefit-risk perceptions through knowledge hubris
is indicated (β = +0.008, LLCI = 0.001, ULCI = 0.02). Our measure of hierarchism is positively associated
with knowledge hubris (β = +0.082, p < 0.01) and positively associated with fracking benefit-risk
perceptions (β = +0.156, p < 0.01). Additionally, a significant indirect effect of hierarchism on fracking
benefit-risk perceptions through knowledge hubris is indicated (β = +0.01, LLCI = 0.003, ULCI = 0.021).

54

Our measure of fatalism was not significantly associated with knowledge hubris scores or fracking benefitrisk perceptions.
Overall, for the general public, results indicate that cultural value orientations – particularly
egalitarianism, individualism, and hierarchism – significantly predict fracking benefit-risk perceptions, with
egalitarians viewing fracking as being more risky, whereas individualists and hierarchs view fracking as
providing greater benefits. Unlike in the policy elite sample, the effects of cultural value orientations on
fracking benefit-risk perceptions were partially mediated through knowledge hubris.
(Figure 2 about here)
Comparing Policy Elites and the General Public
In consideration of the inconsistent results of the previous mediation analysis, we next examine
differences between our two samples – policy elites and the general public – in terms of their knowledge
hubris and benefit-risk perceptions. We first conducted a Welch two sample t-test on benefit-risk
perceptions between the two groups. The mean benefit-risk score for policy elites is 3.47, whereas the
mean score for the general public is 3.63, indicating that the public, on average, has a higher perception
of benefits as compared to risks than do elites. However, this difference is not statistically significant. We
next conduct the same test for knowledge hubris. The mean knowledge hubris score for elites is 0.097,
while the general public mean score is 0.06 – a statistically significant difference (p < 0.05), indicating that
policy elites have higher levels of knowledge hubris than the general public. This finding was somewhat
surprising in light of our previous findings that knowledge hubris predicted benefit-risk perceptions for the
general public but not for policy elites. We therefore examined actual and perceived knowledge levels
between the general public and policy elites separately. For our measure of actual knowledge the group
means were significantly different (p < 0.01) with elites having a mean knowledge score of 0.5 and the
general public having a mean knowledge score of 0.45. Similarly, our measure of perceived knowledge
was significantly different between the two samples (p < 0.01) with policy elites having a mean perceived
knowledge score of 0.6 and the general public having a mean perceived knowledge score of 0.52. The
score variances between policy elites and the general public were inconsistent (see figures 3), with
benefit-risk perceptions and perceived knowledge exhibiting similar degrees of variance between the two
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groups, policy elites having greater variance than the general public in scores of actual knowledge, and
the general public having greater variance than policy elites in knowledge hubris scores.
(Figure 3 about here)
CONCLUSIONS & DISCUSSION
Overall, this study indicates that there is a distinction between policy elites and the general public in terms
of the role knowledge hubris plays in the evaluation of benefits and risks associated with fracking.
Knowledge hubris is similarly predicted by cultural value orientations between the two groups, with the
relationship being stronger for local policy elites. However, this knowledge hubris, while stemming from
similar sources, only affects fracking benefit-risk perceptions for the general public, not for local policy
elites.
This research has significant implications for both theory and practice. While cultural value
predispositions have previously been demonstrated to influence perceptions of risks and benefits across
multiple domains (e.g. Jones & Song, 2014; Kahan et al., 2007; Song, 2014), there has been little, if any,
research comparing this relationship between local policy elites and the general public, particularly on the
same topic. Our findings indicate support for the influence of cultural values on benefit-risk perceptions for
both groups. Importantly, this study demonstrates that the magnitude of the relationship is stronger for
local policy elites. This finding supports research on political sophistication that suggests that those who
are more sophisticated have greater coherency in their ideological views as well as more consistency in
the relationships between ideological persuasions and policy opinions. The current research extends this
ideology-based coherency into the realm of cultural value orientations, arguably a construct more
fundamental to attitudes and beliefs than ideological identity. This result implies the need for more
research on the level at which sophistication provides coherency and structure to an individual’s choices
and attitudes regarding various policy issues.
The finding that cultural values affect knowledge hubris regarding fracking similarly between the
general public and elite in terms of the direction and significance of the relationships is not necessarily
surprising. However, the magnitude of these relationships being greater for local policy elites is
interesting. Experts have been found to make better use of heuristics in decision-making and to be closer
to meeting the rational actor assumption (Feltovich et al., 2006; Mintz, 2004; Zimmerman & Campillo,
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2003). However, in this research, those who are relative experts have higher levels of knowledge hubris a finding seemingly at conflict with past research. However, the difference between the influence of
knowledge hubris on benefit-risk perceptions of fracking between local policy elites and the general public
seem to mitigate this inconsistency. Knowledge hubris shapes benefit-risk perceptions for the general
public, but is not significantly associated with benefit-risk perceptions for local policy elites, indicating that
the decision-making process between the two groups appears to be different – a key distinction. This
difference suggests a need for further research examining both the origins and components of the distinct
reasoning processes of these two groups. It is possible that the general public has similar evaluations of
risk because of cues provided by policy elites and, similar to the concept of identity-protective cognition,
aligning their cultural value identities with both perceived knowledge levels and benefit-risk perceptions.
Future research should focus on other policy issues to examine whether the relationships found here hold
across policy domains. Of particular focus should be the examination of policies at various stages of
development, as it is possible that as a policy issue becomes more salient, these relationships shift in
significance or strength.
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Table 1. Demographic Characteristics
Characteristi
c

Arkansas/Oregon Policy
Elites

Arkansas/Oregon
General Public

U.S. General Public

$70,000 – $100,000

$40,000 – $50,000

$50,000 – $60,000

74%

45%

29%

Race

92% White

84% White

63% White

Gender

65% Male

48% Male

49% Male

Median
annual
household
income
Education
level
(%
Bachelor’s
degree
or higher)
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Table 2. Primary Independent Variables and Measures
Variable

Egalitarianism

Egalitarianism
index

Individualism

Individualism
index

Hierarchism

Hierarchism
index

Fatalism

Fatalism index

Measure
Society works best if power is shared equally. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly
agree)
It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the
poor. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more
equal. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Index using factor score of above three items (Elites α=0.78; Public α=0.79)

We are all better off when we compete as individuals. (1=Strongly disagree to
7=Strongly agree)
Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the
world.(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people
succeed or fail on their own. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Index using factor score of above three items (Elites α=0.73; Public α=0.70)

Society is in trouble because people do not obey those in authority. (1=Strongly
disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
The best way to get ahead in life is to do what you are told to do to the best of your
abilities. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on
those who break the rules. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Index using factor score of above three items (Elites α=0.60; Public α=0.67)

For the most part, succeeding in life is a matter of chance. (1=Strongly disagree to
7=Strongly agree)
No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is largely determined by forces
beyond our control. (1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Most of the important things that take place in life happen by random chance.
(1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree)
Index using factor score of above three items (Elites α=0.68; Public α=0.76)
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Table 3. Knowledge Measures

Variable

Level of
knowledge of
energy policy
issues
(Arkansas/Oregon
policy elites and
the general Public
2015)

Measure
Most scientists and energy experts agree that the estimates for natural gas
AR OR
reserves in the U.S. have increased in the past decade. (0=False; 1=True* * )
Coal-fired electric power plants in Arkansas/Oregon supply the major source of the
OR
AR
state’s electricity. (0=False* ; 1=True* )
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 clearly states that the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) holds comprehensive federal regulatory authorities on
OR AR
fracking practices. (0=False* * ; 1=True)
Currently, there is no government-declared moratorium placed on new injection
AR
OR
wells (for natural gas drilling) in Arkansas/Oregon. (0=False* ; 1=True* )
Currently, the majority of all U.S. natural gas production is attributed to shale gas
OR AR
from fracking operations. (0=False* * ; 1=True)
Due to energy security concerns, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) currently
OR AR
enforces an absolute ban on natural gas export. (0=False* * ; 1=True)
The first commercially successful fracking operation in the United States took
AR OR
place several decades ago. (0=False; 1=True* * )
Percentage of correct answers
On a scale from zero to seven where zero means not at all informed and seven
means completely informed, how well informed do you consider yourself to be
about energy policy in general?
On a scale from zero to seven where zero means not at all informed and seven
means completely informed, how well informed do you consider yourself to be
about fracking operations?

Knowledge index
Perceived
Knowledge
Energy
Perceived
Knowledge
Fracking
Operations
Perceived
Sum of Perceived Knowledge items above converted to a percentage
Knowledge Index
Knowledge
Perceived Knowledge Index score minus Knowledge Index
Hubris
Note: * denotes correct answer (AR=Arkansas; OR=Oregon).
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Figure 1. Effects of Cultural Value Orientations on Perceptions of Risks and Benefits Associated with Fracking as Mediated by
Knowledge Hubris for Local Policy Elites in Arkansas and Oregon
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Figure 2. Effects of Cultural Value Orientations on Perceptions of Risks and Benefits Associated with Fracking as Mediated by
Knowledge Hubris for the General Public in Arkansas and Oregon
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Figure 3. Boxplots Comparing Local Policy Elites and General Public
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Conclusion
Overall, the two papers in this thesis contribute to our understanding of the decision-making
processes of local policy elites. Specifically, these papers elaborate on the relationship between cultural
value predispositions and risk and benefit perceptions by examining the mechanisms by which cultural
values influence policy-related perceptions of utility as measured by perceptions of risks and benefits.
The first article demonstrates that, in the context of HVPL installations in the state of Arkansas
cultural value orientations influence perceptions of trustworthiness of various sources of information,
which in turn influences perceptions of risks and benefits associated with HVPL installations. Specifically,
egalitarians view HVPL installations as having more risks than benefits, partially due to their distrust in the
energy industry and trust in environmental groups. Alternatively, individualists view HVPL installations as
more beneficial than risky, partially due to their trust in the energy industry and distrust in environmental
groups and the government. Similarly, hierarchs view HVPL installations as providing more benefits than
risks due to their trust in the energy industry and the government. This mediating role of trust in
information sources, I argue, is due perceived value congruence between the individual and the group
providing information. These findings provides evidence suggesting that, for local policy elites, the content
of the information may not be as important in the determination of policy support as is the source of the
information.
The second paper introduces the concept of knowledge hubris and examines its cultural valuesbased origins, as well as its effects on risk and benefit perceptions associated with hydraulic fracturing. It
further compares this process between a sample of local policy elites and the general public. Among local
policy elites, knowledge hubris levels were higher, as compared to the general public. However, for local
policy elites, knowledge hubris demonstrated no effects on fracking risk and benefits perceptions,
whereas for the general public, knowledge hubris was found to significantly mediate the relationship
between cultural values and risk and benefit perceptions for egalitarians and individualists. This
distinction between the two samples suggests that, while views on fracking were similar between the
general public and local policy elites, the two groups arrive at these views through distinct cognitive
processes, indicating a need for future research examining the differences in the mechanisms by which
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policy elites and the general public arrive at a particular viewpoint, particular when the views between the
two groups are similar.
Together, these two papers provide insights into how cultural value predispositions lead to risk
and benefit perceptions. Further, and more importantly, they suggest a need for future research to better
explicate these processes in order to better understand perception development and the decision-making
processes that are associated with policy-making and development.

70

71

72

